Prepare for the Worst: Generalizing across Domain Shifts with
  Adversarial Batch Normalization by Shu, Manli et al.
PREPARE FOR THE WORST: GENERALIZING ACROSS
DOMAIN SHIFTS WITH ADVERSARIAL BATCH NOR-
MALIZATION
Manli Shu, Zuxuan Wu, Micah Goldblum, & Tom Goldstein
Department of Computer Science
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742, USA
manlis@umd.edu
ABSTRACT
Adversarial training is the industry standard for producing models that are robust
to small adversarial perturbations. However, machine learning practitioners need
models that are robust to domain shifts that occur naturally, such as changes in the
style or illumination of input images. Such changes in input distribution have been
effectively modeled as shifts in the mean and variance of deep image features. We
adapt adversarial training by adversarially perturbing these feature statistics, rather
than image pixels, to produce models that are robust to domain shift. We also
visualize images from adversarially crafted distributions. Our method, Adversarial
Batch Normalization (AdvBN), significantly improves the performance of ResNet-
50 on ImageNet-C (+8.1%), Stylized-ImageNet (+6.7%), and ImageNet-Instagram
(+3.9%) over standard training practices. In addition, we demonstrate that AdvBN
can also improve generalization on semantic segmentation.
ImageNet
   
ImageNet-C
   
Stylized-ImageNet
   
ImageNet-AdvBN
   
ImageNet-Instagram
      89.6%   goldfinch 
     7.4%    sulphur butterfly
     0.5%    hummingbird
 99.9%   goldfinch 
    0.05%   bulbul
    0.02%   house finch
    57.4%   goldfinch 
     11.8%   brambling
      8.8%    guillotine
    16.2%   gong 
       8.8%   bolete
       4.5%   fox squirrel
       
10.3%   hen-of-the-woods
   5.1%   Ibizan hound
   4.0%   flamingo
Figure 1: Images from ImageNet variants along with classification scores by a pre-trained
ResNet-50 model. The right-most image is generated by our Adversarial Batch Normalization
module. Details on how we generate this image can be found in Section 3.
1 INTRODUCTION
Robust optimization for neural networks has been a major focus of recent research. A mainstream
approach to reducing the brittleness of classifiers is adversarial training, which solves a min-max
optimization problem in which an adversary makes perturbations to images to degrade network
performance, while the network adapts its parameters to resist degradation (Goodfellow et al., 2015;
Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018). The result is a hardened network that is no longer brittle to
small perturbations to input pixels. While adversarial training makes networks robust to adversarial
perturbations, it does not address other forms of brittleness that plague vision systems. For example,
shifts in image style, lighting, color mapping, and domain shifts can still severely degrade the
performance of neural networks (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019).
We propose adapting adversarial training to make neural networks robust to changes in image style
and appearance, rather than small perturbations at the pixel level. We formulate a min-max game in
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which an adversary chooses adversarial feature statistics, and network parameters are then updated
to resist these changes in feature space that correspond to appearance differences of input images.
This game is played until the network is robust to a variety of domain shifts in image space including
texture, color, brightness, etc.
The idea of adversarial feature statistics is inspired by the observation that the mean and variance
of features maps encode style information, and thus, they enable the transfer of style information
from a source image to a target image through normalization (Huang & Belongie, 2017; Ulyanov
et al., 2016). Unlike standard approaches that rely on feature statistics from auxiliary images to
define an image style, we use adversarial optimization of feature statistics to prepare classifiers for
the worst-case style that they might encounter.
We propose training with Adversarial Batch Normalization (AdvBN) layers. Before each gradient
update, the AdvBN layers perform an adversarial feature shift by re-normalizing with the most
damaging mean and variance. By using these layers in a robust optimization framework, we create
networks which are resistant to any domain shift caused by feature statistics shift. An advantage
of this method is that it does not require additional auxiliary data from new domains. We show
that robust training with AdvBN layers hardens classifiers against changes in image appearance
and style using a range of vision tasks including Stylized-ImageNet (Geirhos et al., 2019) and
ImageNet-Instagram (Wu et al., 2020).
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 FEATURE NORMALIZATION
Feature normalization is an important component of modern neural networks that stabilizes training
and improves model generalization. Let f ∈ RN×C×H×W denote feature maps output by a layer,
where N is the batch size, C is the number of channels, and H and W represent the height and
width of the feature maps, respectively. Different normalization methods compute the mean, µ, and
standard deviation, σ, over different dimensions of the feature maps. They use the derived feature
statistics, often along with learned multiplicative and additive parameters, to produce normalized
features, f ′:
f ′ = γ · f − µ(f)
σ(f)
+ β, (1)
where γ and β are learnable parameters which re-scale and shift normalized features. For example,
Batch Normalization (BN) (Ioffe & Szegedy, 2015) estimates feature statistics along the N,H,W
dimensions. On the other hand, Instance Normalization (IN) (Ulyanov et al., 2016) computes µ and
σ for each individual sample in the batch and only normalizes across the H and W dimensions.
Although feature normalization was originally proposed to accelerate the training process (Bjorck
et al., 2018), previous work (Huang & Belongie, 2017; Li et al., 2017) has shown that feature statistics
effectively capture information concerning the appearance of images. Motivated by this observation,
we impose uncertainty on these statistics during training in order to obtain models that are less
sensitive to non-semantic characteristics, thus generalizing to images with different appearances.
2.2 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Untargeted adversarial examples are generated by maximizing classification loss with respect to
the input. One popular method, projected gradient descent (PGD), involves performing gradient
ascent in the signed gradient direction and projecting the perturbation in order to enforce an `∞-norm
constraint (Madry et al., 2018). Adversarial training aims to solve the saddlepoint optimization
problem,
min
θ
E(X,y)∼D
[
max
‖δ‖p<
L(gθ(X + δ), y)
]
, (2)
where gθ is a model with parameter vector θ, X, y is a clean input and the corresponding label drawn
from distribution D, and L denotes cross-entropy loss. Adversarial training solves this problem by
iteratively sampling a batch of data, perturbing the batch adversarially, and performing a parameter
update on the new adversarial batch (Madry et al., 2018). We harness adversarial training in order to
create models robust to distributional shifts rather than the standard pixel-wise adversarial attacks.
2
3 ADVERSARIAL BATCH NORMALIZATION
We propose Adversarial Batch Normalization (AdvBN), a module that adversarially perturbs deep
feature distributions such that the features confuse CNN classifiers. We iteratively compute adversarial
directions in feature space by taking PGD steps on batch statistics. In the next section, we will train
on these perturbed feature distributions in order to produce models robust to domain shifts.
Consider a pre-trained classification network, g, with L layers. We divide g into two parts, g1,l and
gl+1,L, where gm,n denotes layersm through n. Now, consider a batch of data, x, with corresponding
labels, y. Formally, the AdvBN module is defined by
BNadv(x; g, l, y) = δ′σ · (f − µ(f)) + δ′µ · µ(f), where f = g1,l(x),
(δ′µ, δ
′
σ) = argmax(δµ,δσ) L
[
gl+1,L
(
δσ · (f − µ(f)) + δµ · µ(f)
)
, y
]
,
subject to ‖δµ − 1‖∞ ≤ , ‖δσ − 1‖∞ ≤ ,
(3)
where the maximization problem is solved with projected gradient descent. Simply put, the AdvBN
module is a PGD attack on batch norm statistics which can be inserted inside a network. Note that
δµ, δσ are vectors with length equal to the number of channels in the output of layer l, and we multiply
by them entry-wise, one scalar entry per channel, similarly to Batch Normalization. Additionally,
note that this module acts on a per-batch basis so that features corresponding to an individual image
may be perturbed differently depending on the batch the image is in.
We formulate the perturbation by first subtracting out the mean so that δµ · µ(f) is the new mean
of the adversarial features, and δµ directly controls the new mean. We choose δµ · µ(f), rather than
simply δµ, to represent the new mean of the perturbed features so that `∞ bounds and steps size do
not need to depend on the mean of f . Intuitively, we permit the mean of adversarial features to vary
more when the clean features have a mean of higher magnitude.
Visualizing feature shifts To verify our assumption that adversarially perturbing feature statistics
corresponds to transforming the distribution in image space, we visualize the effects of AdvBN. We
adopt the VGG-19 based autoencoder from Huang & Belongie (2017). At the bottleneck of the
autoencoder, we plug in an AdvBN module followed by a VGG-19 classifier (Simonyan & Zisserman,
2015). We visualize perturbations by feeding the AdvBN outputs to the decoder.
In Figure 2, images crafted through this procedure are visibly different from the originals; semantic
content in the original images is preserved, but the new images exhibit differences in color, texture,
and edges. We draw two major conclusions from these visualizations which highlight the adversarial
properties of these domains. The first one concerns textures: according to Geirhos et al. (2019),
CNNs rely heavily on image textures for classification. Images from the adversarial domain, on the
other hand, have inconsistent textures across samples. For example, the furry texture of a dog is
smoothed in column 2, and the stripes disappear from a zebra in column 4, whereas visible textures
appear in columns 6 and 8. The second conclusion pertains to color. Results in Zhang et al. (2016)
Figure 2: Examples of perturbed ImageNet images generated by AdvBN with a decoder. The
first row contains the original versions from the ImageNet validation set.
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suggest that colors serve as important information for CNNs. In the adversarial domain, we find
suppressed colors (columns 1, 3) and unnatural hue (columns 5, 7). See Appendix A.3 for additional
example images generated by this procedure. Figure 3 illustrates how the appearance of reconstructed
images shifts as adversarial perturbations to feature statistics become larger.
We use this visualization technique to process the entire ImageNet validation set and denote it as
ImageNet-AdvBN in Figure 1. By evaluating different methods on this dataset, we observe that
accuracy on ImageNet-AdvBN is consistently lower than that on the original ImageNet dataset.
This degradation in performance validates the adversarial property of features generated by AdvBN.
Experiments concerning performance on ImageNet-AdvBN are listed in Appendix A.2.
Original
Adversarial Strength
Figure 3: The effect of adversarial strength on visualized examples.  = 0 corresponds to images
reconstructed by our autoencoder without AdvBN.
4 TRAINING WITH ADVERSARIAL BATCH NORMALIZATION
In this section, we use the proposed AdvBN module to train networks on the perturbed features. The
goal of this adversarial training routine is to produce networks that both perform well on the data
distribution on which they are trained and also generalize well to many new domains, all without
having to obtain auxiliary data from new domains.
We start with a pre-trained model, g = gl+1,L ◦ g1,l, and we fine-tune the subnetwork, gl+1,L, on
clean and adversarial features simultaneously. To this end, we solve the following min-max problem,
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
L(gl+1,Lθ ◦ BNadv ◦ g1,l(x), y) + L(gl+1,Lθ ◦ g1,l(x), y)
]
, (4)
where L denotes cross-entropy loss, and D is the distribution of batches of size n. This optimization
problem contains a maximization problem inside the BNadv layer. In order to maintain the network’s
performance on natural images, we adopt a similar approach to Xie et al. (2020) by using auxiliary
batch normalization in gl+1,L for adversarial features; we use the original BNs when propagating
clean features, and we use auxiliary ones for adversarial features. See Algorithm 1 for a detailed
description of our method for fine-tuning the parameters of gl+1,L.
Since we start with pre-trained models, we only need to fine-tune for 20 epochs, yielding improved
robustness with little additional compute. Moreover, we only modify the parameters of later layers,
so we do not need to backpropagate through the first half of the network. See Appendix B for an
analysis of training times using our method. In the following section, we measure the performance,
on several datasets, of our model fine-tuned using adversarial training with AdvBN.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 IMPLEMENTATION
Our method begins with a torchvision ImageNet pre-trained ResNet-50 (He et al., 2016). We insert
the AdvBN module at the end of the 2nd convolutional stage. The model is fine-tuned following
Algorithm 1 for 20 epochs. The learning rate starts at 0.001 and decreases by a factor of 10 after 10
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Algorithm 1: Training with Adversarial Batch Normalization
Input: Training data, pretrained network g = gl+1,Lθ ◦ g1,l, PGD bound , and PGD step size τ
Result: Updated network parameters, θ, of subnetwork gl+1,Lθ
for epoch = 1, . . . , N do
Sample mini-batch x with label y;
Obtain feature map f = g1,l(x);
Initialize perturbation: δ = (δµ, δσ);
Let fadv = f ;
for adversarial step = 1, . . . , m do
fadv ← δσ · (f − µ(f)) + δµ · µ(f);
Update δ: δ ← δ + τ · sign(∇δL(gl+1,Lθ (fadv), y));
δ ← clip (δ, 1− , 1 + );
end
fadv ← δσ · (f − µ(f)) + δµ · µ(f);
Minimize the total loss w.r.t. network parameter:
θ ← argmin
θ
L(gl+1,Lθ (fadv), y) + L(gl+1,Lθ (f), y);
end
return θ
epochs with a batch size of 256. We use SGD with momentum 0.9 and weight decay coefficient 10−4.
We augment inputs with a fixed AutoAugment (Cubuk et al., 2019) policy. Adversarial parameters
are τ = 0.2 and  = 1.1 with 6 repeats.
5.2 GENERALIZATION TO IMAGENET VARIANTS
Datasets. We compare our method to other methods designed to produce classification networks
which generalize better. The datasets we consider are ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) and its variants:
• ImageNet-C (Hendrycks & Dietterich, 2019) contains distorted images with 15 categories
of common image corruption applied, each with 5 levels of severity. Performance on this
dataset is measured by mean Corruption Error (mCE), the average classification error over
all 75 combinations of corruption type and severity level, weighted by their difficulty.
• ImageNet-Instagram (Wu et al., 2020) is composed of ImageNet images filtered with a
total of 20 different Instagram filters. This dataset contains 20 versions of each ImageNet
image, each with a different filter applied.
• Stylized-ImageNet (Geirhos et al., 2019) consists of images from the ImageNet dataset,
each stylized using AdaIN (Huang & Belongie, 2017) with a randomly selected painting.
Textures and colors of images in this dataset differ heavily from the originals.
Models. Our baseline model is the publicly available torchvision ResNet-50 pre-trained on Ima-
geNet, denoted as “Standard” in Table 1. All models we compare to, aside from SIN (Geirhos et al.,
2019), are not trained on any of the ImageNet variants that are used for evaluation. The PGD model
is adversarially trained with the PGD attack on inputs and is provided by Engstrom et al. (2019).
MoEx (Li et al., 2020) changes feature moments inside networks but not in an adversarial manner.
IBN-Net (Pan et al., 2018) improves the generalization of networks by combining batch normalization
and instance normalization. AugMix (Hendrycks et al., 2020) is a data augmentation method that
solves the distributional mismatch between training and testing data and increases classification
robustness. SIN is a network trained on both Stylized ImageNet and ImageNet. We do not measure
the accuracy of SIN on Stylized-ImageNet since it acquires knowledge of the target domain during
training. Note that all models we use in our comparisons are the original versions released by the
authors of the original work.
Results. As shown in Table 1, the performance of baseline model significantly degrades on all three
ImageNet variants, highlighting the brittleness of this high performance classification model when
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Table 1: Performance of AdvBN and alternative methods on ImageNet and its variants.
Method ImageNet ImageNet-C ImageNet-Instagram Stylized-ImageNettop1 acc. ↑ mCE ↓ top1/ top5 acc. ↑ top1/ top5 acc.↑
Standard 76.1 76.7 67.2/ 87.6 7.4/ 16.4
PGD 62.4 85.0 49.0/ 71.4 12.5/ 23.9
MoEx 79.1 74.8 70.0/ 89.4 5.0/ 12.0
IBN-Net 77.2 70.3 69.6/ 89.3 10.7/ 22.2
Augmix 77.6 68.4 70.4/ 89.4 11.2/ 23.1
SIN 74.6 69.3 66.9/ 87.4 –/ –
AdvBN 76.5 68.6 71.1/ 89.5 14.1/ 26.9
tested on novel distributions. Fine-tuning with AdvBN, on the other hand, substantially improves
the performance of the standard ResNet-50 model. In particular, we achieve an 8.1% accuracy gain
on ImageNet-C through fine-tuning with AdvBN. On Stylized-ImageNet and ImageNet-Instagram,
our model not only vastly improves upon the baseline model but also achieves the best performance
among all methods with which we compare. The consistent performance boost across all three
benchmarks demonstrates that adversarial training with AdvBN can effectively enhance robustness
against various distributional shifts. Note that this AdvBN model has additional auxiliary BN layers.
See Appendix C for details concerning inference.
5.3 ABLATION STUDY
Where should the AdvBN module be placed within a network? The proposed AdvBN module
can be inserted after any layer in a deep network. In this part, we try inserting the AdvBN at deeper
layers, i.e., conv3_4 and conv4_6. From the results in Table 2, we observe that conv4_6 yields
the worst performance among all three ImageNet variants, indicating that using AdvBN at deeper
layers is not as helpful as at shallower layers. We hypothesize two possible explanations for this
phenomenon: (1) there are fewer trainable parameters when only very deep layers are fine-tuned;
(2) features are more abstract in deeper layers, and perturbing the mean and standard deviation
of high-level features can lead to extremely chaotic feature representations that are harmful for
classification.
Table 2: Ablation studies.
Model ImageNet ImageNet-C Stylized-ImageNet ImageNet-Instagramtop1 acc. ↑ mCE. ↓ top1 acc. ↑ top1 acc. ↑
l = conv2_3 76.5 68.6 14.1 71.1
l = conv3_4 76.0 70.0 19.5 70.2
l = conv4_6 75.3 75.0 11.0 68.5
 = 0.5 76.5 69.4 13.3 70.8
 = 0.7 76.4 69.0 13.5 70.9
 = 0.9 76.6 69.0 13.8 71.0
 = 1.1 76.5 68.6 14.1 71.1
 = 1.3 76.4 68.3 13.2 70.7
 = 1.5 76.2 68.8 13.1 70.4
additive δ 75.9 69.4 13.7 70.2
AutoAugment∗ 76.4 72.1 8.2 70.1
Adversarial strength. The strength of the adversarial attack in the adversarial training framework
has a major impact on model performance (Madry et al., 2018). We test a range of PGD parameters
to demonstrate how the strength of AdvBN affects model performance. We measure strength by the
perturbation bound , where we fix τ to be 0.2 for all settings, and change the number of repeats for
different bounds. The number of repeats n for each  is set to be n = [/0.2] + 1. Results concerning
the impact of adversarial strength are listed in Table 2.
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Multiplicative vs. additive perturbations. We originally chose a multiplicative noise so that a
single perturbation bound can be applied to various layers and architectures regardless of the range
in which feature values lie. To adjust the perturbation bound for an additive noise for each batch of
feature, we compute maximum mean and standard deviation values across channels, µmax and σmax.
Then, in the projection step of the PGD attack, we project perturbations to the mean and standard
deviation into the ranges (− · µmax,  · µmax) and (− · σmax,  · σmax), respectively. The model is
denoted “additive δ” in Table 2. This variant results in slightly degraded accuracy on each dataset.
Data augmentation. AdvBN performing in feature space can easily be combined with input space
data augmentation. To determine what portion of the improvements we observed can be credited to
AdvBN, we fine-tune a pre-trained ResNet-50 following the same routine as before but without the
AdvBN module, adopting the same fixed AutoAugment policy along with all other hyperparameters.
This method is denoted by AutoAugment∗ in Table 2. We see that fine-tuning with AutoAugment
alone does not result in nearly as much improvement as the combined method on all datasets we
consider; even performance on the original ImageNet dataset benefits from the AdvBN module.
5.4 FEATURE DIVERGENCE ANALYSIS
We compare the features extracted by our network to those of a standard ResNet-50 trained on
ImageNet. Following Pan et al. (2018), we model features from each channel using a normal
distribution with the same mean and standard deviation, and we compute the symmetric KL divergence
between the corresponding distributions on the two datasets (A and B). For two sets of deep features,
FA and FB , each with C channels, the divergence D(FA||FB) is computed using the formula,
D(FA||FB) = 1C
∑C
i=1(KL(F
i
A||F iB) +KL(F iB ||F iA)),
KL(F iA||F iB) = log σ
i
B
σiA
+
σi
2
A +(µ
i
A−µiB)2
2σi
2
B
− 12 ,
(5)
where F i denotes the features of i-th channel with mean µi and standard deviation σi.
In Figure 4, we compare the baseline model with our own on two pairs of datasets in the fine-tuned
layers. Since ImageNet-Instagram contains 20 filter versions, we use the “Toaster” filter found in
(Wu et al., 2020) to cause the sharpest drop in classification performance.
We find that the feature divergence in our network trained with AdvBN is substantially smaller on all
layers in the fine-tuned subnetwork. In other words, the distribution of deep features corresponding
to shifted domains is very similar to the distribution of deep features corresponding to standard
ImageNet data. The small divergence between feature representations explains the effectiveness of
AdvBN from a different angle and explains why our model generalizes well across datasets.
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Figure 4: Feature divergence between pairs of datasets using features extracted by AdvBN and
a standard ResNet50.
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5.5 GENERALIZATION ON SEMANTIC SEGMENTATION
We now evaluate AdvBN in the context of semantic segmentation. We train a ResNet-50 based
network with dilated convolutions (Yu & Koltun, 2016) on Cityscapes (Cordts et al., 2016) as our
baseline model following the training protocol in Pan et al. (2018). Cityscapes comprises urban street
scenes from various cities and contains 2975 images with fine annotations for training and 500 images
for validation. To evaluate generalizability, we test the performance of the model on another dataset,
GTA5 (Richter et al., 2016). The GTA5 dataset consists of synthetic images extracted from computer
games, which have similar street scene content as Cityscapes and compatible label categories. The
GTA5 validation set we use contains 6382 densely annotated images.
Table 3: Cityscapes→ GTA5.
mean IoU (%) Pixel Acc. (%)
Baseline 72.0→ 30.6 95.3→ 68.5
AdvBN 71.5→ 38.8 95.2→ 79.8
To apply AdvBN, we fine-tune the baseline model with
AdvBN plugged in after layer conv2_3 on Cityscapes
for 20 epochs with adversarial training parameters τ =
0.15,  = 0.4, and 4 repeats. In table 3, we observe a
performance gain of 8.2% in mean IoU on the GTA5
dataset compared to the baseline model. The pixel
accuracy also improves by 11.3%. Numbers on the left side of arrows denote performance on
Cityscapes, and numbers on the right side of arrows denote performance on the GTA5 dataset.
6 RELATED WORK
Adversarial training Adversarial training and its variants (Goldblum et al., 2020; Madry et al.,
2018; Shafahi et al., 2019) have been widely studied for producing models that are robust to ad-
versarial examples (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016; Szegedy et al., 2014). Recent work considers
adversarial training as data augmentation (Tsipras et al., 2019). Xie et al. (2020) finds that deep
features corresponding to adversarial examples have different mean and standard deviation than those
corresponding to natural images. This work takes advantage of the distributional discrepancy to
improve performance on non-adversarial data. Our work also adopts the adversarial training frame-
work to make models robust against other kinds of perturbations, but instead of crafting adversarial
examples in image space, we craft adversarial feature distributions by perturbing feature statistics.
Robustness to distributional shifts While extensive effort has been made to improve the robust-
ness of classifiers to adversarial examples, there are other kinds of robustness that deep neural
networks must address in order for them to be reliable. Corrupted images and new domains pose
major challenges to networks with standard training (Geirhos et al., 2019; Hendrycks & Dietterich,
2019; Wu et al., 2020). Performance degradation on these images can be attributed to shifts in data
distributions (Gilmer et al., 2018). In order to produce networks which generalize well, one common
practice is to perform data augmentation (Cubuk et al., 2019; Hendrycks et al., 2020; Yun et al.,
2019). However, the benefits of data augmentation are largely limited by the types of augmentations
used during training (Geirhos et al., 2018). Feature space augmentation (Li et al., 2020) replaces
feature statistics corresponding to one sample with ones corresponding to another sample. Our work
can be also considered as feature space augmentation, we instead consider a worst-case scenario in
the context of feature space distributional shifts by adopting the adversarial training framework.
7 CONCLUSION
Our work studies how adversarially perturbing feature statistics simulates domain shift in image data.
We find that adversarial fine-tuning on features perturbed in this way improves robustness to data
stylization and corruption without ever training on auxiliary data. Training with Adversarial Batch
Normalization (AdvBN) is computationally cheap and can quickly make pre-trained models less
brittle. We fine-tune a ResNet-50 with our algorithm and surpass the performance of state-of-the-art
methods on both ImageNet-Instagram and Stylized-ImageNet. Adversarial feature statistics are a
promising direction for creating models that generalize well to a variety of domains.
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A IMAGENET-ADVBN EXPERIMENTS
A.1 CREATION OF THE IMAGENET-ADVBN DATASET
We process the entire ImageNet validation set using the visualization technique introduced in Section 3.
We consider two encoder architectures: one is the VGG-19 encoder we use for visualization, another
consists of layers of a ResNet-50 up to conv2_3. Both encoders are paired with the same decoder
architecture from Huang & Belongie (2017).The resulting datasets, denoted by ImageNet-AdvBN-
VGG and ImageNet-AdvBN-ResNet respectively, contain 50000 images each. The data we synthesize
for testing other models is generated using these autoencoders that contain the AdvBN module but
on ImageNet validation data. AdvBN is conducted with 6 steps, stepsize = 0.20,  = 1.1, and a
batchsize of 32. We do not shuffle the ImageNet validation data when generating these batches.
A.2 CLASSIFICATION ON IMAGENET-ADVBN
Table 4: Classification performance on ImageNet and ImageNet-AdvBN.
Method ImageNet Im-Adv-VGG VGG Reconstructed Im-Adv-ResNet ResNet Reconstructedtop1 acc. ↑ top1/ top5 acc. ↑ top1/ top5 acc. ↑ top1/ top5 acc. ↑ top1/ top5 acc. ↑
Standard 76.1 1.6/ 4.7 45.8/ 70.6 0.4/ 1.3 65.7/ 86.9
PGD 62.4 15.4/ 30.2 54.7/ 77.8 1.0/ 2.2 61.2/ 83.1
MoEx 79.1 1.0/ 2.9 40.2/ 63.8 0.3/ 1.1 65.7/ 86.8
IBN-Net 77.2 2.3/ 6.2 49.2/ 73.9 0.6/ 1.9 69.4/ 89.4
AugMix 77.6 3.9/ 9.9 53.5/ 77.0 1.0/ 2.7 71.9/ 90.7
SIN 74.6 10.9/ 24.4 51.7/ 75.8 1.7/ 4.3 67.2/ 87.9
Ours 76.5 6.3/ 15.6 54.6/ 78.3 2.9/ 6.4 66.4/ 87.3
Table 4 shows the classification performance of various models on the two ImageNet-AdvBN
variants, denoted as Im-Adv-VGG and Im-Adv-ResNet respectively. We also test these models on
ImageNet images that are reconstructed using our autoencoders, denoted as VGG Reconstructed and
ResNet Reconstructed, for each autoencoder. The performance gap between ImageNet-AdvBN and
Reconstructed ImageNet indicates that the degradation on ImageNet-AdvBN is not solely caused by
the reconstruction loss due to the autoencoders we use.
A.3 ADDITIONAL EXAMPLE IMAGES
We include more images from ImageNet-AdvBN-VGG in this section. Example images in Figure 5
are randomly chosen. We do not include the ImageNet-AdvBN-ResNet, because the resulting images
are mostly in extreme contrast with small textures that are hard to observe. It is possible that features
output from ResNet based encoders are more sensitive to AdvBN perturbations; another explanation
is that the features we extract from ResNet-50 are relatively shallow features compared to their VGG
counterparts.
B RUNTIME ANALYSIS
B.1 RUNTIME OF TRAINING WITH ADVBN
We evaluate the training time of our method on a workstation with 4 GeForce RTX 2080 Ti GPUs.
We use the default settings for AdvBN on ResNet-50: an AdvBN module after the conv2_3 layer, a
fixed AutoAugment policy, and 20 epochs of fine-tuning with 6-step PGD inside the AdvBN module.
Fine-tuning is conducted on the ImageNet training set, containing 1.3 million images. Training in
this setting takes approximately 40 hours with batchsize set to 256 .
B.2 COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS CONCERNING TRAINING BUDGET
We use the same infrastructure above to evaluate the training time of other ResNet-50 models that
appear in Table 1. Training code for all other methods are obtained from official repository. For
all methods, we use a batch size of 128, because augmix(Hendrycks et al., 2020) cannot run with
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Figure 5: More example images. For each pair of adjacent columns, original versions are on the left,
ImageNet-AdvBN-VGG is on the right.
a batch size of 256 on our workstation due to limited GPU memory. The number of processes in
the dataloader is set to be 16. The speed values in Table 5 are averaged over 100 iterations. The
estimated training duration is calculated by multiplying the speed and corresponding total number of
iterations. Time spent on evaluation after each epoch is not considered in this estimation.
Table 5: Runtime Analysis.
Model Speed Epochs Estimated training duration(seconds/ iter.) (hours)
Standard 0.17 90 43
PGD 2.95 90 738
MoEx 0.19 300 168
IBN-Net 0.22 100 61
AugMix 0.67 180 335
SIN 0.34 45 43
AdvBN 0.83 20 46
Training with AdvBN takes a long time per iteration because each iteration contains 6 PGD steps.
The SIN (Geirhos et al., 2019) runtime speed is estimated based on standard training, since the model
architectures and training procedures of these two methods are the same, except that SIN is trained
for half the epochs but twice the data and thus twice the number of iterations per epoch. Training SIN
requires additional access to Stylized-ImageNet as training data, which takes 134GB disk space; the
time for generating the Stylized-ImageNet dataset and the extra storage cost are not considered in
Table 5.
C INFERENCE USING MODELS TRAINED WITH ADVBN
Models containing Batchnorm layers will have two set of BN statistics in deeper layers that have been
fine-tuned by AdvBN because we use auxiliary BNs introduced by (Xie et al., 2020) for propagating
adversarial features crafted by the AdvBN module. During evaluation, we can choose either of
the BN statistics to normalize features. The results we report in previous sections with regard to
ImageNet, ImageNet-C and ImageNet-Instagram are obtained by using BN statistics corresponding
to original features. We only use auxiliary BNs, which keep the batch statistics of adversarial features,
to test performance on Stylized-ImageNet in Table 1. We also use auxiliary BNs for evaluating
performances on ImageNet-AdvBN and Reconstructed ImageNet in Table 4.
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